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Decision-Making in the
United States Court of Appeals
New York Law School
Faculty Luncheon
November 19, 1986

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to address the
distinguished faculty of my alma mater.

I know that it is a

distinguished faculty, because it was so difficult to become a
part of it.

The screening process was more stringent than the

one I went through to become a United States Circuit Judge.
faculty applied the strict scrutiny test to me.
underwent a retention election.

The

Recently, I

The Professor who evaluated me

said my teaching technique was okay but that I needed more
practical experience.

He also said that it would look better if

I could have some writings published.
This faculty, as well as the students and alumni, owe a lot
to the Dean -- ulcers, headaches and similar ailments.

The Dean

is writing a book -- "How to Win Friends and Influence the Chief
Justice of the United States."

He recently said that the new

Chief Justice would not be an effective leader of the court and,
if he were effective, we should all be frightened.

What

frightens me is that people who graduated from Yale in the 60's
now are law school deans.

Jim Simon comes to us after a

successful career in Uttar Pradesh, India.

We are most fortunate

to have as Dean a man who has become a legend in his own mind.
Seriously, I do wish to congratulate the faculty.

I think

that this school is fortunate to have first-rate scholars but,
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more importantly, first-rate teachers.

You have trained some

magnificent young lawyers, and I have reaped the benefit of your
work.

Last year, in my Circuit Chambers, I had Michael Roffer

and Phil Essig, who were of great help to me during my first year
on the Circuit Court.

Michael now is with Skadden Arps and Phil

is with Cahill Gordon.

Both earn more than I do.

This year, I

am fortunate to have two especially brilliant people you have
trained -- Charles Sullivan and Holly Januszkiewicz.

As I travel

around to participate in seminars, symposia and moot courts, I
have had the opportunity to meet and speak with law professors
from all over the country.

These meetings and conversations

convince me that the best law faculty in the nation is right here

(

at New York Law School.

All that you need is more visibility,

and I shall do everything I can to help you in that regard.
I have been asked what life really is like behind the
scenes at the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

I shall therefore

take some time before my discussion of decision-making to give
you some "brethren"-type information.
are, of course, a fascinating group.
kind, warm, friendly
true.

people~

My brothers and sister
I could say that we all are

I could say it, but it wouldn't be

A district judge, I'll call him Judge "X," once compared

us to soldiers who come onto the battlefield after the battle and
shoot the wounded.

He said that, because we once wrote an

opinion reversing one of his decisions in the following words:
"This is an appeal from a decision by Judge x, and we reverse for
other reasons as well."

One of my colleagues dissented from one of my decisions in
these words:

"I dissent, substantially for the reasons given in

the majority opinion."

He later changed it to a concurrence:

"I

concur in so much of the majority opinion as is supported by the
reasoning therein and dissent from the remainder."

One of our

judges told another that his clerks had done most of the work on
a particular decision.

The second judge then quoted a portion of

the bible that he said pertained to law clerks:

"Methusaleh

leaned on his staff -- and died."
My colleagues really shine during oral argument.
began his argument:
started again:
(
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"I represent a very unfortunate client."

"I represent a most unfortunate client."

Presiding Judge said:

"Keep going.

He

The

We agree with you so far."

A pro se litigant started her argument by saying:
lawyer."

A lawyer

"God is my

I think it was Judge Kaufman who told her:

"You should

have someone locally."
Sometimes, we talk to each other on the bench.

During one

oral argument by very distinguished counsel, a colleague leaned
over and said:

"When they made him, they threw away the shovel."

Recently, a lawyer opened his argument with these words:

"May it

please the Court, my client sustained severe injuries when he
fell from the loading dock at the post office.

Because of these

injuries, he is unable to have marital relations more than five
times a week."

A colleague whispered to me:

that loading platform?"

"Where the hell is

The same judge described the talents of

one overrated appellate advocate in these words:

"He can take

any dry case and make it dull and boring."
I now turn to my discussion of decision-making in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

I paraphrase

Bismarck when I say that judicial decision-making is like
sausage:

It's better not to know what goes into it.

However,

because some of you have expressed some interest in the subject,
I shall

undert~ke

a brief discussion of the mechanical, as well

as the intellectual ingredients of appellate decisions in my
Court.

Following that, I shall describe how a specific case,

involving a claim of age discrimination in employment, gave rise
to a rule of law in our circuit.

If anybody is awake thereafter

and time permits, I shall then take some questions.
Between 1952 and 1982, while the nation's population
increased by 50%, appeals to the circuit courts grew by 808%.
In 1985, more than 33,000 appeals were filed in the circuit
courts nationwide, about 6% more than in 1984 and almost 44% more
than in 1980.

In 1985, 2,837 cases were filed in my Court in

1985, up from 2,153 in 1980.

We issued 1,219 decisions last

year, comprised of 508 signed opinions, 53 per curiam opinions
and 658 summary orders.

Decisions in the latter category are not

published, are not uniformly available and cannot be cited
because they are deemed to be with precedential value.

There are

168 circuit judges serving in the 13 federal circuits.
Twenty-four of those judges hold seats first established by
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Congress in 1984.

There are 13 seats in the Second Circuit, two

of which were established in 1984.
I give you these statistics to demonstrate the caseload
pressures and time constraints under which we labor.

I offer

this information to dispel the myth that circuit judges have
sufficient time for study, reflection and writing.

It is in fact

almost impossible to give each case the consideration to which it
is entitled, and the first reaction of new clerks is amazement at
the speed with which we must do our work.
Two to three weeks before each scheduled sitting, boxes and
cartons arrive at Chambers in Albany from the Clerk's office at
Foley Square.

Contained in these packages are the briefs and

appendices containing relevant parts of the record in the
twenty-seven or twenty-eight cases to be heard by the
three-member panel to which they are assigned.

The cases will be

sorted into files by the two secretaries and three clerks who
comprise the Chambers staff.

Before the sitting, I will have

read each one of the briefs and skimmed each one of the
appendices.

In addition, the pro se law clerks employed by the

Court will have provided a bench memorandum with recommendations
as to each pro se appeal, and my clerks will have done the same
as to all the other cases.
As we work along toward the sitting week, I discuss with my
clerks the cases they have been assigned.

Although the

responsibility for writing bench memos is divided, each clerk
receives a copy of the memos written by the other clerks.

5

In

this way, I can have input from each clerk on all the cases prior
to argument.

In addition, it is a tradition in my Chambers that

the clerks have dinner with me one evening a week.

We take that

occasion to have some far-ranging discussions about the cases
coming up at the next sitting as well as the progress of the
opinions being drafted.

It should be apparent that the decision-

making process is in a very advanced posture by the time I arrive
at my New York City chambers for the sitting.

By that stage, I

have formed at least a tentative opinion in each case, subject to
persuasion by oral argument or by discussion with my colleagues.
The Second Circuit is the last federal court of appeals to
maintain the tradition of oral argument in each case.

11.lthough

all the other circuits pre-screen cases for oral argument, we
continue the practice of allowing argument to all who request it,
including pro se litigants.

The judge presiding sets the time

limits, which range from five to twenty minutes per side.
recent exception was the II.gent Oranges cases.

II.

I was a member of

the panel hearing those cases, and we had two days of argument,
the longest since the Learned Hand Court heard the Jones &
Laughlin Steel case.
In spite of what some may think, oral argument continues to
be a vital part of the decision-making process.

Quite often, a

judge will remark, following oral argument, that his perception
of the case was turned completely around by the oral exchange.
That being true, it is a source of increasing concern to me that
the state of appellate advocacy in general, and appellate oral
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advocacy in particular, is so poor.

Dean Jonakait has been

quoted as saying that advocacy courses should be part of the core
curriculum.

To that, I say "Amen."

The best appellate advocacy

today is in the law school moot court competitions.
Final decision-making occurs in the robing room following
oral argument in some of the cases.

Tentative votes are recorded

in other cases, and voting memos will be exchanged in the
remainder.

Voting memos are a long standing tradition in the

Second Circuit and customarily are exchanged on the day of oral
argument or on the following day.

These memos provide a written

record of a judge's vote as well as a brief summary of rationale.
They are of great value to the judge ultimately assigned to write
the opinion.

Some appeals are determined to be of so little

merit that summary orders of aff irmance are drawn and signed on
the day of argument.
The sitting week includes intense concentration on
decision-making.

The two clerks and one secretary who accompany

me to New York are busy in drafting summary orders and assisting
with bench memos and research.

In addition, a number of

substantive motions require the attention of the staff during the
week.

At week's end, the judges meet and review all the cases

heard during the week, discuss the voting memoranda and describe
any additional thoughts they may have had since the memoranda
were exchanged.

The votes are then taken and recorded, and

opinions are assigned by the senior active judge, unless that
judge is the dissenter.

In the latter case, the next senior

..,

active judge assigns.
does it?

Thus ends the decision-making process.

Or

It does not, because the circulation of opinions may

lead to shifts in position as the judges reconsider the positions
they have taken right up to the filing of the opinion.

This will

be illustrated in the actual case I intend to discuss later.
Usually, there are between five and ten cases assigned to me
for written opinions in various stages of completion in my
chambers.

Although I would prefer to do the first draft of each

opinion, time constraints make that impossible, so I share first
draft responsibilities with the Clerks.

I do insist on doing my

own first drafts in all concurring and dissenting opinions, all
voting and other memoranda and in all other correspondence
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addressed to my colleagues.

Sometimes, I seek comments from my

Clerks on extracurricular articles and speeches I have written.
All first drafts of opinions undergo extensive revisions at my
hands.

Finally, I conduct a conference, with all Clerks present,

to review penultimate draft of the opinions.

Fine tuning occurs

at that time, and the opinion is ready for circulation to my
colleagues on the panel.
The decision-making process continues.

Our tradition is to

put aside all other work on receipt of a colleague's opinion in
order to review and comment immediately.

If a Judge is satisfied

with a colleague's opinion, a small tab with the words "I concur"
will be returned to the writer to attach to the original opinion
when it is filed.

Sometimes, the concurring tab is accompanied

by a memo suggesting, but not requiring, certain changes in the
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opinion.

On occasion, a memo comes in unaccompanied by any tab.

The memo might say:

"I intend to concur if you change this

paragraph or that sentence or this rationale.

If you do not, I

shall be constrained to concur or dissent, or something."

It is

at this point that I begin to think that I should have remained
a trial judge.

In any event, the decision-making process

continues in an effort to accommodate the views of all panel
members -- "hunting for the elusive tab," as I call it.
course, the tab may come in with the words:

Of

"I concur in a

separate opinion" or "I dissent in a separate opinion,"
accompanied by an appropriate concurrence or dissent.
The decision-making process becomes very intense as the
opinion circulates.

The panel members may confer by telephone in

an effort to reach consensus as perceptions of the case shift.
The panel may be realigned as to rationale or as to the bottom
line of the decision.

When it all shakes out, the writer has in

hand the finally revised opinion and possibly one or two
concurrences or a dissent.

If a dissent, the two judges in the

majority will confer to decide whether any refutation of the
dissent should be included in the majority opinion.

The

dissenter may wish to refute the refutations of the majority.
Eventually, the opinion gets filed.

But filing is not the end of

the decision-making process.
In a great number of cases, a petition for rehearing with a
suggestion for a rehearing in bane is filed.

The panel members

thereby get another crack at the decision-making process.

(}

Recently, a panel of which I was a member was constrained to
grant such a petition because we had granted relief in favor of a
non-appealing party.

If there is a vote to deny rehearing, the

petition then is circulated to the entire court along with the
panel vote.
bane.

Any judge may then call for a vote on a rehearing in

A majority vote of the active judges is needed to convene

the court for such a rehearing.

Although that is rare, we did

sit in bane earlier this month to hear a case involving the Hobbs
Act.

After such a sitting, the decision-making process

continues, with the exchange of voting memoranda and the
assignment of the case to a judge who will have the great good
fortune of pulling together the voting memoranda of a majority of
the court in a way that will satisfy all.

With the filing of the

majority opinion and the concurrence and dissents, if any, of the
in bane court, the decision-making process is conCluded -- until,
of course, the case is remanded from the Supreme Court for
further proceedings.
Reflecting on the intellectual process of appellate
decision-making in the Second Circuit after a year on the job, I
am impressed by the narrow constraints by which we are bound.
For example, we are required to accept the factual findings of
the Trial Judge, unless they are clearly erroneous.

I have long

held the belief that in most cases, a statement of the facts
dictates the legal conclusion.

Although it sometimes seems

apparent to me that the facts are different from those found by
the Trial Judge, I cannot say that the findings are clearly
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erroneous.

So in a number of cases where it is apparent to me

that the result should be different, there is nothing I can do
about it.
said:

I recall the words of Professor Ivan Soubbotitch, who

"In the practice of law, you will deal with feet much more

than with law."

Students should continue to be aware of that.

Precedent and stare decisis also constrain the intellectual
process of decision-making.

If there is a precedent in the

Second Circuit, it is not easily overruled by our Court. If a
panel considers it necessary to depart from circuit precedent,
the opinion is circulated to the entire court for comment.

If

there is precedent in another circuit, we must distinguish it,
agree with it or give it careful reason why we disagree.

~lways,

we must make sure that our decisions are consistent with Supreme
Court doctrine.
In the interpretation of statutes, the various rules of
construction establish the parameters of decision-making.
~lways,

there is the temptation to apply judicial gloss and to

fill in that which Congress has omitted, a temptation I am happy
to avoid in the Frankfurter tradition.

"Divining Congressional

intent• is the term that is used, because the skills of a fortune
teller are called for.

In connection with the interpretation of

a criminal statute, I recently asked my class why it was
necessary for the Court to read into a statute something that
Congress did not put there -- why the Judiciary was any better
than the Congress to deal with the problem.

~

student answered:

"More able minds,• an answer I found flattering but a very poor
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reason for judicial law-making.

At any rate, my point is that,

although the courts sometimes have gone afield in statutory
interpretation, they are constrained by many rules of limitation.
There are other limits upon the intellectual decision-making
process in the form of rules we must abide by:

that federalism

counsels restraint when passing upon state action; that evidence
in a criminal case is viewed on appeal in the light most
favorable to the government; that generally, error cannot be
assigned on appeal unless there are proper objections in the
trial court; that matters cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.

This is a work in progress and I am sure that there are

many more limitations.

,
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My thesis simply is that appellate judges

work within a very narrow compass indeed.
Working within that compass, however, there is room for some
flexibility and creativity in both the reviewing for correctness
and law-making functions in the Courts of Appeals.

This brings

me to my illustration of a case that brings the whole process
together.

The case is Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates,

and the final decision is found in 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
Dr. Hyland was a radiologist and a founder, officer and equal
shareholder in the defendant professional corporation.

The

corporation was formed to conduct the practice of radiology and
performed all such services for a local hospital.

All the

founding members contributed the same amount of capital, drew the
same salaries and benefits, had equal voices in management and
shared equally in profits and losses.
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They each executed

customary shareholders' agreements as well as agreements
governing their employment by the corporation.
Apparently, certain problems arose and the plaintiff was
asked to resign his position.

He entered into an agreement

relating to the termination of employment and then sued in the
United States District Court, claiming, among other things, that
the corporation had discriminated against him because of age, in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
The issue before us was whether the plaintiff was entitled
to the benefits of the Act as an employee of the corporation or
whether the district court was justified in holding that he
should be considered a partner and therefore not entitled to the
benefits.

The district court held that the enterprise was

managed and operated like a partnership and that the corporate
entity was chosen merely to gain advantageous tax and civil
liability treatment.
My initial impression was to affirm, since I agreed that the
so-called economic realities test should be applied.

The test

had been developed in a number of cases as a means of
distinguishing employees from independent contractors or partners
in other contexts, including anti-discrimination litigation.

In

the original exchange of voting memoranda, the Presiding Judge
voted to affirm on the basis of the economic realities test; the
other member of the panel voted to reverse on the application of
a per se rule.

In my voting memorandum, I agreed with the

Presiding Judge that the economic realities test should be
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applied but voted to reverse on a finding that the plaintiff was
an employee under that test on the facts of the case.
We continued to discuss the case after returning to our home
chambers and finally agreed that there should be no per se rule
but that the plaintiff qualified as an employee.
Judge assigned himself to write the opinion.

The Presiding

When the opinion

came to me, I agreed with the ultimate conclusion but decided
that I could not go along with the rationale and so indicated in
a memorandum.

The writing Judge weighed in with his memorandum

to the effect that his proposed opinion was a compromise anyway,
and that he would revert to his original position in favor of
affirmance, essentially for the reasons given by the trial court.

(
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The other Judge wrote a memo that he too would revert to his
original position, the position with which I had come to agree.
Following a telephone conference, we decided that we could
not arrive at a consensus in this case, and the original writer
became the dissenter.

The majority opinion was assigned to me by

the third Judge, who had seniority.

The result, a per se rule in

the case of corporate employees who sue for ADEA violations, is
now the law of the circuit.

In writing the opinion, I was

required to disagree with a Seventh Circuit case that held,
without further analysis, that the role of a shareholder of a
professional corporation is more analogous to a partner in a
partnership than it is to the shareholder of a general
corporation.

I wrote, however, that "[i]t is one thing to apply

an economic realities test to distinguish an employee from an

independent contractor or partner, but it is quite another to
apply the test in an attempt to identify as partner one
associated with a corporate enterprise."

The dissent applied the

realities test and found the plaintiff to be a partner and
therefore not an employee entitled to the benefits of the ADEA.
In any event, the judgment of the district court was reversed and
the matter "remanded for further proceedings consistent with the
foregoing."
I told you it was like sausage.

